The current understandings and practices related to biological and social fatherhood raise a crucial legal question about which model of fatherhood determination should be adapted to contemporary society: the model of a biological or social father bearing the rights and obligations related to the child. The general ideologies of being a father and the application of different approaches have been analysed comparatively, also trying to provide the best legal policy to consider when interpreting the rules of parenthood in Estonian Family
INTRODUCTION
In 2014 the Estonian Family Law Act was amended, providing a new rule that if a mother is married and gives birth to a child, then in the process of registering the birth of her child, the father of the child can become any other man than the mother's husband, without consent or even an obligation to inform the husband.
This was a radical change for the Estonian family law, which has always followed the pattern of presumption of paternity of the husband of the mother. In the legislative process the amendment was presented as a tool to protect children who were born in ostensible marriages of a mother or in undivorced cross-border marriages, but no one has discussed what the legal or legal-sociological implications of such an amendment might mean in general for the ideology of paternity in the Estonian legal system. While long-lasting political disputes over same-gender partnership in Estonia took place, there were a lot of references to the need to protect traditional marriage. But on the matter of new paternity regulation, no one noticed or at least failed to mention anything in the legislative process or later in the media that the preclusion of the consent of the mother's husband can affect traditional marriage as well. Until this amendment, Estonian paternity law had been based on "marriage presumption" -i.e. the mother's husband has been presumed the biological father of the born child and any other possibility to be or become a father instead of a husband has been seen as exceptional to this primary principle.
Family law is very slow to change because of the traditional understandings of the family as a unit 1 ; so the abovementioned amendment raises questions about the value of the predictability of a parent but also about the rights and interests of the child. For example, one can ask whether the previous values related to the presumption that a husband of the mother is a father of the child as a member of the family unit has suddenly lost its meaning. This leads to an additional question 
WHY ALL THIS MESS?
The law has historically relied on a biological construction of fatherhood which, during the development of society, was attached to the man's relationship to the child's mother (i.e. being a husband 2 )-expressed by the rule pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant. This meant that the biological father of the child was considered the husband of the mother. It is also clear that in the patriarchal family model the husband played the most important role and hence the children his wife gave birth to were his children regardless of who the biological father was.
Traditional marriage in this context has been protected to keep family relations easy and clear 3 : husband and wife share a bed and hence the children born in this relationship are the children of a husband. The traditional bionormative family structure has undergone dramatic transformations 4 , raising sensitive and ethical questions 5 . According to Bakerm, "there is a growing consensus that family law as a 2 In some states this principle has been currently applied also to the partners or cohabitee of a mother. a child but refuse the father visitation rights to the child. So, in both models (marital and/or biological presumption) a pattern for preventing financial social problems from a state can be noted. One assumes that even in a patriarchial system this probably was one of the reasons to oblige the husband and protect the wife; or, as some authors state, the child. Later, when the patriarchal system collapsed and traditional marriages began to "fade away," the idea to put financial obligation related to a child on someone else instead of the state developed successfully as well. Fatherhood itself was treated as a tool for a state to bind someone financially responsible for a child -a model where every child must have a father -no matter whether a biological or just a social one. 8 14 However, at the time of soviet occupation and some time after beginning of independence when the soviet family law rules preserved there was applied a phenomenon as 'paper father' in Estonian family law which meant that in the birth document a first name of the father of the child was written by the mother's saying and the family name of the child was mother's family name. This data meant that this child did not have a father. 
WHAT IS THE BEST MODEL FOR CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY?
Marriages often do not last and, if spouses do not legally finish their relationships before starting a new one, children are born to mothers who are still married to men who might not be biological fathers of the children. This and the general principle that in cases where the parents of the child are not married, the mother has the right to decide who is the father of her child, has caused discontent from the side of biological fathers. They argue that married and unmarried fathers are treated differently. So long as a non-married father has not acknowledged the child as his and the mother of the child has approved that, this man is "no one" to the child in the legal sense. Fenton-Glynn argues that this different treatment On one hand, the fact that a woman and a man exercise their right to have a child, this creation of a life will serve the best interest of the child 38 . On the other hand, in those cases when a woman gets pregnant after a single instance or occasional intercourse, then certainly there is no intent to procreate a child from the man's side and it can be discussed whether it is the best interest of the child to obligate such person to be a father, even a biological father. 39 Even more, the rights of the child can collide with the rights of the parent. Duggan describes filiation as:
A genetic bond existing between a child and his mother and father, who, in this context, are seen as providers of two unique gemetes which at the moment of fertilisation gave beginning to the child's life. Secondly, filiation can be described as a legal relationship, by virtue of which certain individuals, who fulfill premises prescribed by the law, are deemed to be the child's parents and hence are capable of becoming depositaries of certain rights and duties towards each other and towards the child. These rights and duties flow from the abovementioned 40 She also states that social filiation has been described as performing the caring role of the child.
With Lisbon Treaty the protection of the child was proclaimed as part of the Unions's objections enshrined in art 3 of the TEU. 41 Primary rights for a child are provided by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Concerning fatherhood two rights are usually discussed: the right to a parent and the right to the child's identity. Article 7 of CRC states that a child has the right to know and be cared for by his/her parent. As the convention does not define the concept of "parent", some authors argue that it is not so clear whether provision means "biological parent" or "adoptive parent." 42 Additionally, participating states of the convention interpret this provision differently. Kelly states that "it can be argued that art 7 does not ensure a child's right to know and be cared for by his or her biological parents, but rather preserves the child's right to know and be cared for by those individuals who are actually parenting the child, whether biological or social." 43 Article 8 of CRC refers in respect to the child's identity even as a fundamental right of respect for one's private life. Denying a child to his/her biological parent affects his/her identity, dignity, autonomy and liberty. Some authors have stated that to impede a child from knowing his or her parent can be discrimination against the child 44 . As noted above, the knowledge of one's origins can be essential to the healthy development of the child but does not ultimately demand that a biological father should be considered more important than a non-biological social father.
Though art 8 of ECHR does not distinguish between the legitimate and illegitimate child, it would not be so easy to decide in this context what the best interests of the child are, with respect to the family life of both: a single mother and her child but also unwed father. 45 relevance of fatherhood in family relations.
Preferring a biological father can be grounded by the principle known already from the Bible that every person is responsible for his deeds. 50 But is it reasonable to follow this principle in all cases? When a man is a father for too many children with too many different women 51 or a child is born because of rape? Being a financial father usually means also the right of the father to be a social father.
Establishing such a "fake" family cannot always be in the best interest of the child 52 . Also, in some states being a biological father gives a man a right to demand care from the grown-up child.
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Technological procreation has made pregnancy and birth of a child less "holy"
and "mysterious" than it had been earlier, as technology allows for making more clear and planned choices to have a child. It can be that biological creation of the child is soon just one tool for having a child next to the technological procreation. A similar development can be seen as happening to traditional marriage, which, despite the attempt to prioritize, has lost its importance and is currently only one . Can such fathers be social fathers for all their children in sufficient and equal way? Also, thinking about the fulfilling the maintenance obligation for all children seems unrealistic. 52 ECtHR has stated: "… there may exist valid reasons to deny an unmarried father participation in parental auhtority, as might be the case if arguments or lack of communications between the parents risk jeopardising the child's welfare (Zaunegger vs Germany, ECtHR, Appl No 22028/04, p 56.). 53 E.g. in Estonia a child can become free form the obligation only when he/she proves that this man has not maintained him/her but one can assume that proving this is not an easy task.
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type of family life next to all others. And, even more, development of reproductive technology can result in the situation where multiple parents can share a genetic link to the child 54 , and not only three but six or more parents. Undoubtedly this will reduce the importance of biological parenthood. Margalit, Levy, and Loike discuss that in such cases it would be complicated to determine "which of these individuals should be deemed the child's legal parents when no single party has a superior genetic claim to any other" 55 and state that all those six parties have equal parental rights as biological parents but "may have intended for two of biological parents to be primary parents, undertaking the bulk of the obligations and enjoying most of the benefits, while the other four would serve as secondary parents in a more limited social capacity."
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The child's interest must be reflected in the rules providing the establishment of legal fatherhood. From these norms one should reread how those interests are protected, covering financial, social, psychological, and physical, or whatever support. As these are the obligations a parent carries, it must be clear who is obliged or desires to fulfil them. In case there are too many parents raising a child, following their own "moral, cultural, or religious ideology" 57 can in fact seriously harm a child. In this respect it would be risky to provide many parents for a child.
Would it be fair to treat children born through technological procreation differently from those who are born through traditional, biological procreation? One must have a father, another must not? What if we assign another meaning to biological origins: a collection of genetical info, and leave this out from the list of presumptions entirely? Margalit, Levy, and Loike refer in their article to Haldare, who predicted already in 1924 that "by the year 2074 less than 30 per cent of children would be gestated by a woman". 58 However, the bigger the number of parties in a relationship the more complicated it will be to regulate this relationship.
This allows for the claim that fewer parents are better for a child. Sometimes even two is too much 59 .
Additionally, in legal literature and policy documents it has been sometimes emphasized that the best family for a child is a mother and father of a different sex. bother her husband at all -just register the birth of the child with another man and a husband would not even know that he is not entered as a father into the child's birth data.
These norms in Estonian Family Law Act provide a "legal fiction of biological fatherhood" 68 because exceptions are based on biological parentage. And, the "authority to decide" has been left to the mother of the child. On the one hand this seems to be relevant -who else if not a woman should know who the father of the child is. But, on the other hand, this new regulation also supports the increase of unfinished legal relations. It is possible that by protecting a child a mother of the child would never care about the divorce with a man from the past. For example, a case where a woman with three (ostensible) marriages abroad and with no money to divorce gives birth to a child with a fourth man. This man could become a father through a court process based on his biological tie to the child but the state decided to facilitate the process: no need to divorce or get a declaration of not being a father of the child from the husband(s) 69 of the mother, but just the intent of the biological father and mothers' consent is enough. In the case in which a man is a biological father, the rights of the child seem to be protected according to Estonian model; when a woman is a person who has already had several ostensible marriages, it seems to be reasonable to ask whether this last is now an ostensible paternity case.
Also, in this case again the biological tie is not very important. In practice this child can be raised by a fifth man who acts as a social father even if the mother has three valid marriages and a fourth man, who is a father in the child's birth registry but is not his/her biological father. To make the situation more complicated, what if one of the mother's husbands turns to the court of his country of residence to state that the child is his because the child was born at the time of the marriage justifying the suit on the law of his country of residence.
Discussion in this article shows that there are many contradictory interpretations on parenthood. Also, the development of society has changed the previous understandings of who should be a father. One can also predict the changes that will follow. However, it can be stated that the concept of the social father has started to brush aside the concept of the biological father. Changes in 67 E.g. when a mother does not sign the joint application. Such husband can protect his rights by contestation of paternity within one year as of the date when the person entitled to contest paternity becomes aware of the circumstances which are the basis for contestation. 68 See Fiona Kelly, supra note 8: 316. 69 There can be problem to decide which husband of them three.
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the Estonian legal regulations are still inclined to the biological fatherhood getting the support of the scholars who preach "constitutional duties of natural parent."
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Even though the aim of the amendment described above intended to protect children born in an ostensible marriage of a mother or in undivorced cross-border marriages, this change has led to a preference for biological fatherhood. But, in the process when the biological tie has not been controlled through DNA-testing, the decision is made only on the basis of the statement of the mother of the child. In real life there are similar legal problems in Estonia about the biological and social fatherhood as in other states, but considering the court practice one can assume that biological fatherhood principles are preferred in decisions. Some authors state that also in Estonia the biological and social father should be given a new meaning:
biological parentage should be a mere fact of biological ancestry, while a social father may act as a legal father with all the responsibilities and rights that it entails.
That is, the intent of biological fatherhood should also be considered, but not being as significant of a factor as a social father.
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In Estonia there are no rules providing that in certain cases one cannot acknowledge fatherhood, e.g. in the context of teenage pregnancy or in a situation of rape, incest, or abuse.
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It seems that from the view of the state in Estonia the main concern related to parenthood is the financial obligation of the father. Because the father is considered to be a biological father, all the legal means are pointed towards determining biological fatherhood. As custody and maintenance obligations are treated separately, in the case when the father of a child loses custody, then care obligation still remains. This means that being a social father with emotional ties to a child is separated from the obligation to pay alimony to the child, e.g. if a biological father does not meet a child regularly or not at all but pays alimony, or differently, a non-biological father has an emotional tie with the child but has no obligation to pay any supplies for the child. Also, when biological fathers refuse to pay alimony it does not reduce their right to meet a child.
Similarly to other states, in Estonia the number of children born outside marriage of the parents is high. There exist non-traditional family models, and artificial insemination is allowed but in more restricted ways than in other states, It is evident that in a civil law legal system it is more complicated to determine and solve problems related to parenthood. As mentioned above, the best interests of the child should have been written in a legal act and it would be disputable whether at all and how much a judge can fail to follow a clearly written legal norm when deciding a case on the basis of child interests. The law should clearly establish what the "best interests" of the child are as well as the rules of interpretation for judges and the sanctions for failing to observe these rules if the court do so. This article analysed the concept of fatherhood, discussing whether the biological or social father should carry the meaning of legal fatherhood. The discussion was based partly on the case of Estonian law which was amended precisely to address a changing society, but, as the authors stated, it further complicated the previous principles related to fatherhood, and this situation remain unresolved.
CONCLUSIONS
In short, too many rights collide in the question of who should be the legal father of a child; even based on the interests of the child it would not be easier to decide. Though it seems that almost every case needs an individual approach, we still conclude that the concept of the social father protects the interests of the child more effectively and is more suitable for the current social climate as well as for the near future, to be considered as legal fatherhood. The best interests of a child should become the central principle-it should not be forgotten, that "parenting is 73 Married to each other.
